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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In the first of these two consolidated cases, Austin Clyde was sentenced to a
fixed term of ten years—the maximum—after pleading guilty to one count of burglary.
In the second case, Mr. Clyde was sentenced to a unified term of seven years, with four
years fixed, after pleading guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine). He contends the district court erred in relying upon unreliable and
unsupported statements contained in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) and
GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary (“G-RRS”).

He also contends the

district court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence in light of the
mitigating factors that exist.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On November 10, 2014, Mr. Clyde allegedly entered a Wal-Mart store, took an
item from the automotive department, and returned that item to the customer service
department, receiving in exchange a Wal-Mart gift card in the amount of $73.14.
(R., p.17.) On November 11, 2014, Mr. Clyde allegedly entered the same Wal-Mart
store, took multiple items from the electronics department, and returned those items to
the customer service department, receiving in exchange a Wal-Mart gift card in the
amount of $151.58. (R., p.15.) Mr. Clyde was charged by Information in Case No.
2015-1094 with two counts of burglary and two counts of petit theft. (R., pp.24-27.)
On May 14, 2015, Mr. Clyde was a passenger in a car that was found to contain
methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.94-96.) Mr. Clyde was
charged by Information in Case No. 2015-1490 with one count of possession of a
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controlled substance (methamphetamine) and one count of possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana). (R., pp.113-16.)
Mr. Clyde entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant to which he
agreed to plead guilty to one count of burglary in Case No. 2015-1094 and to
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in Case No. 2015-1490 in
exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. (R., pp.42-45, 143-46.) The State
agreed to recommend that Mr. Clyde be sentenced on each count to a unified term of
five years, with two years fixed, with the two sentences to be served concurrently.
(R., p.43.) The district court accepted Mr. Clyde’s pleas and dismissed the remaining
counts. (Tr., p.6, Ls.21-25, p.12, Ls.20-24; R., pp.63-65, 167-69.) Mr. Clyde was not
admitted to drug court because his LSI score was too high and because he was
assessed as needing inpatient treatment, and the case proceeded in the district court.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.8-11.)
At sentencing, the State recommended that Mr. Clyde be sentenced to two
unified terms of five years, with two years fixed, to be served concurrently, with the court
retaining jurisdiction. (Tr., p.20, L.18 – p.21, L.1.) The prosecutor stated “[a]ll of the
factors of sentencing seem to indicate that is appropriate.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.1-2.) Counsel
for Mr. Clyde recommended probation. (R., p.71.)
The sentences imposed by the district court greatly exceeded even the State’s
recommendation. The district court said that “the main issue for sentencing” was the
following statement from the PSI:

“During the presentence interview, [Mr. Clyde]

reported he was convicted of three counts of Aggravated Murder at the age of 14. He
said he shot and killed three rival gang members and stabbed one of the victims 16
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times.”

(Conf. Exs., p.6; Tr., p.23, Ls.9-14.)

Mr. Clyde’s attorney explained that

Mr. Clyde claimed to have committed three murders “to make himself look tougher and
bigger” and noted that there had been an effort to investigate whether these murders
had occurred, and no record of them could be found. (Tr., p.22, Ls.3-24, p.23, Ls.2-5,
p.24, Ls.15-22, p.29, Ls.23-25.) Mr. Clyde’s attorney also explained to the district court
that the drug court had “basically . . . dismissed” these claims due to the lack of
verification. (Tr., p.24, L.23 – p.25, L.2.) Mr. Clyde’s attorney stated that “we haven’t
come up with anything other than he was just talking tough.”

(Tr., p.26, Ls.8-9.)

Mr. Clyde himself told the district court: “I’ve never killed anybody. I’m not a violent
person. I don’t even get in fights, for crying out loud.” (Tr., p.32, Ls.9-11.)
Despite the lack of evidence indicating Mr. Clyde committed three murders, and
despite Mr. Clyde’s statement at sentencing that he never killed anybody, the district
court relied heavily on Mr. Clyde’s supposed “confession.” (Tr., p.25, Ls.6-7.) On the
burglary count, the district court sentenced Mr. Clyde to ten years fixed—the maximum.
(R., p.75.)

On the possession of a controlled substance count, the district court

sentenced Mr. Clyde to a unified term of seven years, with four years fixed. (R., p.179.)
The court ordered the two sentences be served consecutively and retained jurisdiction
for a period of 365 days with the recommendation that Mr. Clyde participate in the
therapeutic community rider. (R., pp.75, 79-80, 179, 182-83.) The judgments were
entered on September 14, 2015. (R., pp.74-78, 178-81.) Mr. Clyde filed timely notices
of appeal on September 28, 2015, and October 13, 2015. (R., pp.84-86, 190-92.) The
two appeals were consolidated by order of this Court on October 23, 2015. (R., p.198.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it relied at sentencing upon unreliable and
unsupported statements contained in the PSI and the G-RRS?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Clyde an
aggregate unified sentence of seventeen years, with fourteen years fixed, in light
of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Relied At Sentencing On Unreliable And Unsupported
Statements Contained In The PSI And The G-RRS
As sentencing, “[t]he court may consider hearsay evidence, evidence of
previously dismissed charges against the defendant, or evidence of charges which have
not yet been proved, so long as the defendant has the opportunity to object to, or to
rebut, the evidence of his alleged misconduct.” State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 926
(Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). “It is error, however, for the court to consider such
information if there is no reasonable basis to deem it reliable, as where the information
is simply conjecture or speculation.” Id. In the present case, the district court erred in
relying on Mr. Clyde’s supposed “confession” contained in the PSI and the G-RRS
because there was no reasonable basis to deem the confession reliable.
In sentencing Mr. Clyde, the district court relied principally on Mr. Clyde’s
statement to the presentence investigator that he committed three murders.

This

supposed confession is also contained—and repeated multiple times—in the G-RRS.
(Conf. Exs., pp.91, 93, 96, 100, 101.) At sentencing, Mr. Clyde’s attorney stated that
the PSI evaluation and G-RRS assessment were done at the same time by the same
person.1 (Tr., p.29, Ls.20-21.) The district court relied on the statements contained in
the PSI and the G-RRS despite the fact that the presentence investigator specifically
noted that “[n]o information pertaining to this crime could be located in NCIC records or

As the Court of Appeals has noted, the G-RRS “is, as its name indicates, not a formal
mental health evaluation but a screening tool from which are developed
recommendations for referral to other evaluations or service . . . .” Coleman v. State,
No. 41080, 2014 WL 4930758, at *3 (Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014) (unpublished).

1
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information provided by the Utah Division of Juvenile Justice Services.” (Conf. Exs.,
p.6.) Mr. Clyde’s juvenile records were attached as exhibits to the PSI and were before
the district court at sentencing.

(Conf. Exs., pp.20-32.)

These records reflect that

Mr. Clyde has a juvenile record consisting of multiple contempt violations and
convictions for providing false information and for fraudulent use of a financial
transaction card. (Conf. Exs., pp.6, 27.) These records are entirely consistent with
Mr. Clyde’s statement at sentencing that he “went to a juvenile facility on the charges of
fraudulent credit card use.” (Tr., p.28, Ls.9-10.) As he explained it, “I took my uncle’s
credit card and I went and used it because I wanted a cell phone because I thought I
needed one.”

(Tr., p.28, Ls.10-12.)

There is no reliable evidence that Mr. Clyde

committed murder.
Mr. Clyde’s attorney explained at sentencing that Mr. Clyde claimed to have
killed three people “to make himself look tougher and bigger” and it “was never anything
that happened.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.22-24.) The district court seemed to recognize this as a
possibility. The court stated:
One of two things happened: Either [Mr. Cook] killed three people in Utah,
in which case I think a sentence at or near the maximum is appropriate
because he represents an extraordinary danger to society; or number two,
he didn’t commit three murders, which shows very unusual thinking, and
it’s unusual thinking on many levels and it would also make a misreporting
by the PSI preparer to misreport what he said.
(Tr., p.31, Ls.14-21.) It may be unusual for a person to claim to have committed a crime
he did not commit, but it is certainly not inconceivable. Mr. Clyde explained to the
district court: “I’m 19 years old and I’m going to a drug house or trying to sell drugs or
whatever, people look at me like I’m just a youngster, you know. And in my head that’s
what I needed to do to prove to people that I was a big guy . . . .” (Tr., p.26, L.23 – p.27,
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L.2.)

This thinking may be “unusual”—perhaps even “on many levels”—but it is

understandable, and explains why no records of the supposed murders could be found.
If the district court had concerns about Mr. Clyde’s confession, which it clearly
did, it could have continued the sentencing hearing and ordered the State to further
investigate the matter.

The district court could also have ordered an additional

investigation pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 32(f), which permits a sentencing judge to
“order an additional investigation of the case if the judge deems it necessary and use
such results in considering the disposition.” But what the court could not do is what it
did here—rely on the unreliable and unsupported statements contained in the PSI and
G-RRS in fashioning Mr. Clyde’s sentence, a sentence which is clearly not justified by
the statutory sentencing considerations. The district court erred and the sentences it
imposed should be reduced either by this Court or by the district court on remand.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Clyde, An
Aggregate Unified Sentence Of Seventeen Years, With Fourteen Years Fixed, In Light
Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Mr. Clyde asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate unified
sentence of seventeen years, with fourteen years fixed, is excessive. Where, as here,
the sentence imposed by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151
Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)). “When a
trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is
reasonableness.’”

Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).

“A

sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
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protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted). “When reviewing the reasonableness
of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of
the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
The sentences the district court imposed upon Mr. Clyde were clearly not
reasonable. The first factor for this Court to independently examine is the nature of the
offenses. See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834. Mr. Clyde returned items to Wal-Mart that he
did not purchase, and used the gift cards that he received to purchase food and clothes.
(Conf. Exs., p.4.) This was the factual basis for his conviction for burglary. (Tr., p.10,
Ls.3-14.) Mr. Clyde also got into a vehicle, knowing there “was a bong that . . . had
residue on it . . . .” (Tr., p.12, Ls.3-6.) This was the factual basis for his conviction for
possession of a controlled substance.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.12-14.)

The district court

recognized that the sentences it imposed upon Mr. Clyde were not justified by the
nature of the offenses. The court stated at sentencing, “And I also understand that just
the nature of the offenses themselves don’t automatically call for a sentence that long,
but everything in your PSI was extraordinary okay? And people . . . it’s really not typical
on a PSI to think, you know, hey, I’ll talk about killing three people and think maybe that
will get me probation.” (Tr., p.39, Ls.19-25.) This statement clearly reflects that the
district court sentenced Mr. Clyde based predominantly upon the unreliable and
unsupported statements contained in the PSI and G-RRS, as discussed above.
The second factor for this Court to independently examine is the character of the
offender. See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834. Mr. Clyde was nineteen years old at the time he
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committed the offenses at issue.

(Conf. Exs., p.1.)

These were his first felony

convictions. (Conf. Exs., pp.4-6.) Mr. Clyde was subjected to severe physical, sexual
and emotional abuse as a young child.

(Conf. Exs., p.8.)

He first smoked

methamphetamine with his mother at the age of seven, and began using other drugs at
the age of eight. (Conf. Exs., pp.8, 13.) Despite a traumatic childhood, Mr. Clyde
demonstrated at sentencing true evidence of change, and real potential for future
growth. At the time of sentencing, Mr. Clyde had obtained full-time employment (for the
first time in his life), was recently married, and was expecting a baby. (Tr., p.21, Ls.1821; Conf. Exs., p.11.)

These are not characteristics of an offender deserving an

aggregate unified sentence of seventeen years, with fourteen years fixed.
The third factor for this Court to independently examine is the protection of the
public interest. See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834. There is no indication that a lengthy
prison sentence is necessary to protect the public interest in this case. Mr. Clyde’s
offenses were not crimes of violence, and presented no risk of harm to Mr. Clyde or
others. Mr. Clyde stated at sentencing, “I just got this job. And I don’t want to be in
prison. I don’t want to go in there on a rider or whatever and however long it may be
and miss out on my kid being born and miss out on this happening or whatever may be
happening.” (Tr., p.33, Ls.6-10.) Mr. Clyde is motivated to succeed, despite his terrible
upbringing, and deserves a second chance. In light of all the mitigating factors, and
notwithstanding the aggravating factors, the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing Mr. Clyde to an aggregate unified term of seventeen years, with fourteen
years fixed.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Clyde respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed and indeterminate
portions of his sentences and place him on probation. Alternatively, he requests that
this Court remand these cases to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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